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LatinoJustice PRLDEF, The DREAM Bar Association, and individuals 
Sergio C. Garcia, Cesar Adrian Vargas, Jose Manuel Godinez-Samperio, Karla 
Q. Perez Ramirez, Denia C. Perez, Marisol Conde-Hernández, Kelsey C. Burke, 
and Jackeline Saavedra-Arizaga (collectively “the LatinoJustice Amici”), 
hereby respectfully submit this amicus curiae brief in support of Petitioners 
Mary Doe and Jane Doe, who seek a rule change that would “allow Bar 
admission for undocumented immigrants who otherwise meet Utah standards 
for admission.” Petition (“Pet.”) 1. This Court’s November 19, 2018 order 
invited briefing on whether this Court may “‘enact[] … a [S]tate law’ under 8 
U.S.C. § 1621(d) permitting membership in the Utah  State Bar for 
undocumented immigrants; and, if so, whether it would be appropriate for this 
Court to do so.” On January 17, 2019, this Court granted the LatinoJustice 
Amici leave to file this brief.  
INTRODUCTION AND AMICI’S INTEREST IN THIS MATTER 
Petitioners1 were brought to the United States as children and know only 
the United States as their home. Pet. 2. And they are not alone—hundreds of 
                                              
1 Petitioners filed the petition under the pseudonyms “Mary Doe” and 
“Jane Doe” to preserve their privacy. Pet. 1. Consequently, this brief uses the 
generic term “Petitioners” to describe the two individuals seeking admission to 
the Utah Bar under the proposed rule change, despite Rule 24(d). See Utah R. 
App. P. 24(d) (stating this Court’s preference that parties in a case “not be 
described solely by the party’s procedural role”).   
 
2 
thousands of people share this story.2 Some, like Petitioners, aspire to be 
lawyers. Through hard work and dedication, they graduate high school, college, 
and law school, often excelling far beyond their peers. Federal law, however, 
purportedly prohibits states from providing any benefits including professional 
licenses to these praiseworthy individuals unless “a State” expressly opts out 
of the prohibition. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d). The Petition asks this Court, as the 
constitutionally authorized arm of the State, to “opt out” by adopting proposed 
Rule 14-721, which would expressly allow Petitioners and those law graduates 
similarly situated to “be admitted to the Bar.” Pet. Ex. A.  
The Petition presents two major issues: whether this Court is the 
appropriate branch of government to opt out, and whether opting out is the 
appropriate thing to do. For the reasons set forth below, this Court has the 
authority to opt out under § 1621(d), and it should grant the Petition and adopt 
a rule authorizing unauthorized immigrants3 to “be admitted to the Bar.” Pet. 
Ex. A. The LatinoJustice Amici agree with amicus curiae Ad Hoc Coalition of 
Utah Law Professors that this Court should adopt a rule that allows “the 
                                              
2 As of July 31, 2018, there were just over 700,000 active DACA recipients. 




3 This brief uses the term “unauthorized immigrants” to be consistent with 
this Petition’s chosen term. Pet. Ex. A.  
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admission of otherwise eligible unauthorized immigrants to the practice of law 
in Utah,” regardless of their precise immigration status. Br. of Ad Hoc 
Coalition of Law Professors 25–28. In this Brief, the LatinoJustice Amici refer 
to this broader rule as the “Proposed Rule.”  
The LatinoJustice Amici are especially interested in the outcome of this 
proceeding. Founded in 1972 as the Puerto Rican Legal Defense Education 
Fund, LatinoJustice PRLDEF works to create and protect opportunities for the 
greater pan-Latinx4 population, particularly for its most vulnerable members, 
including recent immigrants. For forty-seven years, a core and unique focus for 
LatinoJustice has been its efforts to diversify and improve the legal system by 
increasing law school admissions opportunities for students of color and 
enhancing diversity within the legal profession. To that end, LatinoJustice has 
counseled, mentored, supported, and advocated for or litigated on behalf of 
many DREAMers5 and DACAmented6 law students working toward becoming 
                                              
4 “Latinx” is the “gender-neutral alternative to Latino or Latina.” Latinx, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/Latinx (last visited Mar. 26, 2019).  
5 “DREAMers” refers to those who would likely benefit from the 
Development, Relief, and Education of Alien Minors (“DREAM”) Act, should it 
become federal law.  
6 “DACAmented” is a play on the term “documented” as used in the 
immigration context, and the term is commonly used to refer to the work 
authorization documents provided to beneficiaries of the Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) policy.   
 
4 
lawyers. Among them are DREAMer law graduates who have been admitted 
to practice in New York, Florida, California, New Jersey, Connecticut, 
Pennsylvania, and Texas among other states, including those individuals 
discussed in the Petition. See Pet. 7–12.  
Of particular relevance in the instant proceeding, LatinoJustice 
represented Cesar Vargas, a DREAMer and a 2011 City University of New 
York law graduate, in his successful New York bar admission effort. His case, 
In re Vargas, 10 N.Y.S.3d 579, 582 (App. Div. 2015), is one of the leading cases 
in the country addressing the eligibility of DACAmented law graduates for 
state bar admission.  As discussed below, the New York court determined that 
a DACAmented law graduate like Vargas could fulfill the requisite character 
and fitness and requirements for bar admission and be granted a professional 
law license. Id. at 587–89, 597. LatinoJustice has been involved with several 
other bar admission cases throughout the country, either representing 
individuals seeking admission or filing amicus briefs on their behalf. 
LatinoJustice thus has a long, well-established interest in the issue facing 
Petitioners, as well as significant experience in the issues facing this Court.  
The DREAM Bar Association has a keen interest in this case as well, and 
for largely the same reasons. The DREAM Bar Association is an 
unincorporated organization that welcomes undocumented and allied legal 
professionals, law students, and aspiring law students. The Association 
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collects no dues or other monies.  Its members include individuals similarly 
situated to Petitioners—otherwise qualified individuals who hope to graduate 
law school and be admitted to the bars of their respective states. The DREAM 
Bar Association has a deep interest in ensuring its members and the broader 
community receive the chance to become successful members of the bar in all 
states.   
Finally, several individuals join LatinoJustice and the DREAM Bar 
Association as amici in this brief. They include DREAMer and other immigrant 
law graduates from other states, including Cesar Vargas, Sergio Garcia, and 
Jose Manuel Godinez-Samperio, whose “test” bar admission cases in New York, 
California, and Florida have previously addressed the very issues presented 
herein. They also include immigrant law graduates who became members of 
the bars in Texas, Florida, New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut. These 
individuals have a unique, real-world perspective on the legal and practical 
issues surrounding the bar admission of immigrant law graduates, as 
discussed more fully below. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Federal law prohibits states from providing certain “professional 
license[s]” to immigrants who are “not lawfully present in the United States.” 
8 U.S.C. § 1621. But states may opt out of this prohibition “through the 
enactment of a State law.” Id. § 1621(d). Petitioners ask the Court to adopt 
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Rule 14-721 as part of this Court’s Rules of Professional Practice.  It would 
allow “[u]nauthorized immigrants” to be admitted to the Bar if they (1) 
otherwise qualify, (2) were brought to the United States as children and have 
lived here ever since, and (3) received “documented employment authorization 
from the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services.” Pet. Ex. A. The 
issues presented by the instant petition are whether this Court  is the 
appropriate authority to “enact[] … a State law” under § 1621(d), and whether 
this Court should enact such a law.7 See Order dated 11/20/2018, Case No. 
20180806-SC.  
STATEMENT OF THE CASE  
I. The Department of Homeland Security Established Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals in 2012.   
In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) established 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”), under which DHS may 
exercise its discretion in refraining from deporting or removing from the 
country certain unauthorized immigrants.8 DACA is one of several forms of 
                                              
7 But, as explained by amicus Ad Hoc Coalition of Utah Law Professors, 
there is a compelling argument that a Utah bar license does not fall within 
§ 1621’s prohibition. Br. of Ad Hoc Coalition of Law Professors 7–15. Thus, this 
Court need not “opt out” under § 1621(d) if § 1621 does not apply to Utah bar 
licenses.  





“deferred action” that federal executive authorities have offered to individual 
immigrants, or groups of immigrants, for humanitarian or other reasons.9 
DHS considers recipients of deferred action lawfully present in the U.S. 
for certain purposes.10 For example, if DACA recipients eventually leave the 
country and seek re-admission to the United States, their time as DACA 
recipients will not count as time in “unlawful presence,” which otherwise might 
have counted against their future admissibility.11 Similarly, the federal Real 
ID Act, under which states may issue drivers’ licenses only to immigrants 
                                              
9 For a review of federal use of deferred action before the DACA policy was 
announced, see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion 
in Immigration Law, 9 Conn. Pub. Intl. L. J. 243 (2010). 
10 See USCIS, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Toolkit, at 
10–11 (July 29, 2014), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/ 
Humanitarian/Deferred%20Action%20for%20Childhood%20Arrivals/DACA_T
oolkit_CP_072914.pdf; see also Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 
1059 (9th Cir. 2014) (“DHS considers DACA recipients not to be unlawfully 
present in the United States because their deferred action is a period of stay 
authorized by the Attorney General.”). 
11 See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(3) (providing that deferred action does not count 
as “unlawful presence”); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii) (an alien is deemed 
“unlawfully present” for purposes of ineligibility for future admission if the 
alien is present beyond a “period of stay authorized by the Attorney General” 
or without being admitted or paroled). 
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“authorized [to] stay in the United States,” expressly identifies deferred action 
as a “period of authorized stay.”12 
Although DACA does not confer “lawful status” on an individual (because 
only Congress can create or define an immigration status13), DACA recipients, 
like others who receive deferred action, are eligible for employment 
authorization. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14). 
To be eligible for DACA relief, an applicant must be an alien without 
lawful status who arrived in the United States before the age of sixteen and 
who is now less than thirty-one years old. Applicants must also have no 
significant criminal record, as well as a high-school education or service in the 
U.S. armed forces.14 
II. DHS May Also Grant Temporary Protected Status to Certain 
Unauthorized Immigrants.   
Besides DACA, DHS may also designate certain foreign countries for 
Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”). 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b). For unauthorized 
immigrants from such designated countries, the Attorney General “may grant 
                                              
12 Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, § 202(c)(2)(B)(viii), (C)(i)-
(ii), 119 Stat. 302, 313; see also Brewer, 757 F.3d at 1074 n.9 (Christen, J., 
concurring). 
13 See DHS, Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 8.  
14 See USCIS, Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 




the alien temporary protected status in the United States.” Id. § 1254a(a)(1)(A). 
A person granted TPS is protected from removal and may obtain authorization 
to work in the United States. Id. § 1254a(a)(1)–(2).  
An unauthorized immigrant granted TPS is similar to a DACA 
recipient—the person is able to live and work in the U.S., but TPS “does not 
lead to lawful permanent resident status or give any other immigration status.” 
Temporary Protected Status: What is TPS, https://www.uscis.gov/ 
humanitarian/temporary-protected-status (last visited Mar. 26, 2019). TPS, 
however, is not limited to those who were brought to this country as minors. 
See id. Amicus Kelsey Burke is an example of a person granted TPS who, as 
discussed below, was ultimately admitted to practice in Florida.15  
III. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities 
Reconciliation Act of 1996.   
Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (“the 1996 Act”) in 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 U.S. Stat. 
2105. The 1996 Act prohibits states from conferring certain public benefits, 
including professional licenses, upon defined “aliens” unless they are exempted. 
8 U.S.C. § 1621(a), (c)(1)(A). The stated goals of this prohibition are to promote 
self-sufficiency of residing noncitizens, and to prevent “the availability of 
                                              
15 The availability of TPS supports the argument that this Court should 
adopt a broader rule than the one Petitioners propose. Br. of Ad Hoc Coalition 
of Law Professors 25–28.  
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public benefits” from being “an incentive for immigration.” 8 U.S.C.§ 1601. 
Immigrants are incentivized to rely on their own capabilities and not U.S. 
public benefit systems. Id. Despite these goals, the statute inexplicably 
includes certain professional licenses within the definition of a state public 
benefit. 8 U.S.C. § 1621. Nothing in the statute’s text or legislative history 
indicates why professional licenses, which would promote self-sufficiency, are 
categorized as a public benefit. 
Regardless, the prohibition against professional licenses has an 
important exception rooted in federalism. Under § 1621(d), a state may give 
benefits to immigrants who are not lawfully present if it does so by “the 
enactment of a State law.” The Petition refers to this exception as “the opt out” 
provision. Pet. 3–4. The opt out provision shows that, although Congress was 
concerned about public benefit access to unauthorized immigrants, Congress 
also recognized that each state has the right to make its own decisions about 




I. THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE PROPOSED RULE AND 
ALLOW UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT LAW GRADUATES BAR 
ADMISSION BECAUSE A BAR APPLICANT’S IMMIGRATION 
STATUS DOES NOT PREVENT THAT APPLICANT FROM 
ESTABLISHING CHARACTER AND FITNESS FOR 
PRACTICING LAW. 
Petitioners, and other qualified immigrant law graduates, possess the 
qualities and traits necessary for the practice of law and can fulfill all the 
requirements for admission to the Utah Bar, were it not for their immigration 
status. This Court should adopt the Proposed Rule because this Court’s 
character and fitness rules already ensure that only qualified applicants 
practice law in Utah. The Proposed Rule would not alter that requirement or 
enable an otherwise unqualified applicant from obtaining a bar license. 
Immigrant law graduates are undoubtedly capable of establishing the 
requisite character and fitness for practicing law in Utah. They possess the 
same personal qualities as any other non-immigrant law graduate. A bar 
applicant’s immigration status does not inherently reflect anything negative 
about that applicant’s character or fitness for practicing law. Inasmuch as 
there is no apparent valid reason for this Court to categorically preclude 
immigrant law graduates from practicing law, this Court should adopt the 
Proposed Rule.  
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A. The Character and Fitness Committee’s Individualized 
Review of Bar Applicants Ensures that Only Qualified 
Applicants Obtain a Bar License.  
This Court’s rules governing admission to the Utah Bar already ensure 
that only well-qualified applicants of good moral character gain admission to 
the bar. A categorical ban on unauthorized immigrants from the practice of law 
would be inconsistent with the individualized review prescribed by this Court’s 
current rules.  
Among other things, law graduates applying to the bar must prove “by 
clear and convincing evidence” that they graduated from an approved law 
school, have good moral character, and have passed the MPRE and the bar 
exam. Utah R. Bar Admission 14-703. Attorney applicants, like Petitioners, 
must also prove their admission to another state’s bar and that they are in 
good standing in all jurisdictions where they are admitted. Id. 14-704(a).  
To prove sufficient moral character, all applicants must “pass a character 
and fitness investigation.” Admissions, Utah State Bar, 
http://www.utahbar.org/admissions/ (last visited March 26, 2019); see also 
Utah R. Bar Admission 14-708. The Character and Fitness Committee’s 
investigation is an individualized review of an applicant’s background to 
determine if the applicant’s “record of conduct justifies the trust of clients, 
adversaries, courts, and others with respect to the professional duties owed to 
them.” Utah R. Bar Admission 14-708(a). As part of the process, the Character 
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and Fitness Committee can gain access to and review an applicant’s prior 
employment records, school records, credit report, health care facility records, 
and records regarding formal or informal complaints or charges against the 
applicant. Id. 14-707(a) (requiring bar applicants to include in their 
applications “an authorization and release enabling the Bar to obtain 
information concerning the Applicant”); Authorization and Release Form, Utah 
State Bar, http://www.utahbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Authorization-
and-Release-1.doc (Utah Bar’s notarized form indicating the full extent of the 
authorization an applicant provides the Character and Fitness Committee for 
its investigation). The process is thorough. It may include an informal 
investigative interview, a formal hearing, and a later review of a formal 
hearing decision. Id. 14-708(b)–(c).  
Petitioners, like most other unauthorized immigrant law graduates in 
similar situations, are otherwise qualified for admission into the Utah Bar, and 
they would likely be admitted if Utah opted out of § 1621’s broad, blanket 
prohibition. Pet. 2–3, 6. They have graduated from approved law schools, 
already passed rigorous bar and MPRE exams in other jurisdictions, and have 
otherwise proved their high moral character and fitness to practice law. Utah’s 
current application process ensures only high-qualified individuals obtain a 
bar license, and categorically banning unauthorized immigrants from being 
eligible for the bar adds nothing to that process and robs Utah of legal talent. 
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Thus, adopting the Proposed Rule would have no adverse impact on the quality 
of attorneys admitted to the Utah Bar.   
B. Unauthorized Immigrants Are as Capable of Practicing 
Law as Other Utah Attorneys.  
A person’s immigration status is not relevant to the key traits the 
Character and Fitness Committee considers in determining an applicant’s 
character. In determining an applicant’s character, the Character and Fitness 
Committee considers, among other things, evidence of an applicant’s honesty, 
academic and work history, financial and professional responsibility, 
emotional and mental stability, drug or alcohol dependence, civility, diligence, 
reliability, and civil, criminal, or disciplinary charges. Utah R. Bar Admission 
14-708(d), (f).  
A person’s immigration status does not affect these issues—
unauthorized immigrants are equally able as other applicants to demonstrate 
they possess these traits and are honest, responsible, and civil. Thus, a 
complete ban of unauthorized immigrants will accomplish nothing more than 
preventing highly qualified and morally fit applicants from serving as 
upstanding Utah attorneys.  
The experiences of the following LatinoJustice Amici prove the point. 
Amicus Cesar Vargas came to the U.S. from Mexico at five years old, 
after his father passed away. See In re Vargas, 10 N.Y.S.3d 579, 582 (App. Div. 
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2015). After graduating from a New York public high school, Mr. Vargas 
attended St. Francis College in Brooklyn, id., as an honors student. He then 
attended law school at the City University of New York, where he obtained 
valuable internships with Main Street Legal Services, Inc., the Office of the 
District Attorney of Kings County, and a New York State Supreme Court 
Justice.  Id. He also worked as a legislative intern for a member of the United 
States Congress. Id. at 582–83. After graduation from law school, he took (and 
passed) the New York bar, applied for DACA, and then applied for admission 
to the New York Bar. Id. During all of this, Mr. Vargas also co-founded the 
Dram Action Coalition advocacy group. A subcommittee of New York’s 
Character Committee found that Mr. Vargas “appears to have stellar character” 
and that, were it not for the legal issues surrounding his immigration status, 
it “would have no hesitation recommending Mr. Vargas’ admission to the New 
York Bar.” Id. at 584.  
The Vargas court ultimately held that the judiciary had the authority to 
opt out of the statute under § 1621(d), and determined that Mr. Vargas was 
eligible for admission to the New York Bar. Id. at 589–97. Since then, Mr. 
Vargas has had a successful legal career, including speaking at congressional 
hearings, volunteering at legal clinics to help immigrants learn their rights, 
and providing pro-bono representation to children facing deportation in 
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immigration court. 16  Recently, NY1, a New York cable television station, 
brought Mr. Vargas on board to answer questions from the public and discuss 
immigration law and issues. 17  Mr. Vargas is also a frequent political 
commentator on CNN, MSNBC, FOXNews, Univision, and Telemundo, and he 
is a columnist on The Hill, Washington Post, New York Times, Politico, and 
other top publications, where he writes on immigration issues. Mr. Vargas is 
now a lawful permanent resident, and just over a month ago, he enlisted in the 
U.S. Army and is currently in basic training at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.  
Amicus Sergio Garcia grew up in both Mexico and the U.S. In re Garcia, 
315 P.3d 117, 121 (Cal. 2014). His parents brought him to the U.S. when he 
was an infant but moved with him back to Mexico when he was nine years old. 
Id. His parents then brought him back to the U.S. when he was seventeen years 
old, at which time Sergio’s father filed an immigration visa petition on Sergio’s 
behalf. Id. But, due to the massive “backlog of persons of Mexican origin who 
are seeking immigrant visas,” as of 2014, Sergio’s visa number still had not 
                                              
16 See, e.g., Rebecca Klein, An Undocumented Teen Gains Asylum With The 
Help Of His Undocumented Lawyer, HUFFINGTON POST (July 22, 2017, 8:00 
AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/cesar-vargas-undocumented-
lawyer-client_us_59727244e4b09e5f6ccf6cf6.  





come up—“more than 19 years” after his father submitted his visa petition.18 
Id. at 121–22. Sergio graduated high school in California and received offers to 
attend Stanford, University of California at Berkley, and University of 
California at Davis, but he was unable to accept those institutions’ 
scholarships due to his immigration status.  Instead, he attended Butte College, 
California State University at Chico, and Cal Northern School of Law, where 
he received his law degree in May 2009. Id. at 122. In July 2009, he passed the 
California bar examination on his first try.19 See id. The California Committee 
on Bar Examiners found Sergio otherwise qualified for admission to the 
California bar, and after the California legislature opted out of § 1621(d), he 
was admitted to the California bar. Id. at 120. He now works as a California 
attorney. Paul Elias, Associated Press, Immigrant California lawyer finally 
gets green card, LAS VEGAS SUN, (June 4, 2015, 6:00 PM), 
                                              
18 Sergio eventually received his green card after being admitted to the 
California bar as an unauthorized immigrant. Paul Elias, Associated Press, 
Immigrant California lawyer finally gets green card, LAS VEGAS SUN, (June 4, 
2015, 6:00 PM), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2015/jun/04/immigrant-
california-lawyer-finally-gets-green-car/.  
19 Passing the California bar is no easy feat—only 56.4 percent of Sergio’s 
peers passed the July 2009 exam. Staci Zaretsky, California’s Bar Exam 
Passage Rate Reaches 32-Year Low, ABOVE THE LAW (Nov. 21, 2016, 12:15 PM), 
https://abovethelaw.com/2016/11/californias-bar-exam-passage-rate-reaches-





Amicus Jose Manuel Godinez-Samperio came with his parents to the U.S. 
from Mexico in 1995, when he was nine years old. He arrived on a B-2 
Nonimmigrant Visa20 , but then lost his visa status, thereby becoming an 
unauthorized immigrant. Still, he graduated as the valedictorian of his high 
school class and obtained a private scholarship to attend New College of 
Florida.  After he graduated, he attended Florida State University College of 
Law, also on a private scholarship. He passed the bar in 2011 but was not 
initially admitted to the Florida Bar. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re Question 
as to Whether Undocumented Immigrants are Eligible for Admission to the 
Florida Bar, 134 So.3d 432, 433 (Fla. 2014) (per curiam). Instead, the Florida 
Board of Bar Examiners sought an advisory opinion from the Florida Supreme 
Court about admitting unauthorized immigrants. Id.  
The Florida Supreme Court determined (incorrectly) that § 1621(d)’s opt 
out provision required the Florida Legislature to act. Id. at 435. Notably, the 
parties did not raise the Tenth Amendment issues posed by the court’s 
interpretation of § 1621(d), and thus the court did not address that issue, 
                                              
20 The B-2 visa is referred to as a “Tourism” visa. U.S. Department of State, 
Visitor Visa Overview, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/ 
tourism-visit/visitor.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2019).  
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discussed more fully below. A few months later, Florida’s legislature adopted 
legislation to opt out of § 1621, which paved the way for Mr. Godinez-
Samperio’s admission to the Florida bar. See The Florida Bar, Godinez-
Samperio Finally Becomes A Florida Lawyer, FLORIDA BAR NEWS (Dec. 15, 
2014), https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-news/godinez-samperio-
finally-becomes-a-florida-lawyer/.  
Amicus Kelsey Burke was initially denied permission to take the bar 
exam by the Florida bar examiners based on the Florida Supreme Court’s 
incorrect interpretation of § 1621(d). Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 134 So.3d 
at 437. She came to the U.S. from Honduras when she was ten years old, 
making the trek by foot, and after graduation from high school, she obtained 
Temporary Protected Status 21  and work authorization. Frank Cerabino, 
Legislators should act to help worthy Boynton immigrant be admitted to 
Florida Bar, THE PALM BEACH POST (Mar. 12, 2014, 12:01 AM), 
https://pbpo.st/2JmaLwC. She worked her way through college at Florida 
Atlantic University, finishing her bachelor’s degree in three years and 
graduating debt free. See id. She then graduated from law school at Florida 
                                              
21 As noted above, TPS is similar to DACA in that it grants deferred status 
on a person, protects that person from removal, and allows that person work 
authorization. USCIS, Temporary Protected Status: What is TPS, 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2019).  
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Agriculture and Mechanical University, for which she paid through a private 
loan with help of a generous family that took her in. Id. After the Florida 
Legislature opted out of § 1621’s prohibition, Ms. Burke was eventually 
permitted to take the Florida bar exam and be admitted to the Florida bar. She 
is one of a handful of female personal injury attorneys in Palm Beach County, 
and she mentors students from middle school to law school, as well as young 
attorneys in the community through volunteering and pro-bono work.22 
Amicus Denia Perez was born in Mexico and came to the U.S. with her 
parents when she was eleven months old. San Francisco State University, 
Alum Denia Perez Becomes First DACA Recipient Admitted to Connecticut Bar 
(Nov. 9, 2018), https://bit.ly/2YfbX8t. She is the first in her family to graduate 
from college and based on her experience (and her parents’ experience) with 
the U.S. immigration system, Ms. Perez decided to attend Quinnipiac 
University School of Law. Soon after graduating law school, Ms. Perez spoke 
at a public hearing of the Connecticut Rules Committee, which was considering 
a change to Connecticut’s bar admission rules to allow those like Ms. Perez 
admission to the Connecticut bar. Robert Storace, This Undocumented 
Immigrant Just Graduated Law School. Now She Wants To Change Who Can 
                                              
22 Senator Durbin of Illinois shared Ms. Burke’s story on the floor of the 




Practice Law, CONNECTICUTLAWTRIBUNE (May 14, 2018, 3:27 PM), 
https://bit.ly/2FoVgi5. Connecticut adopted its new rule in June 2018, which 
allows admission to the bar so long as the applicant is “authorized to work 
lawfully in the United States.” Robert Storace, This Young Attorney Is the First 
DACA Recipient Admitted to Practice Law in Connecticut, 
CONNECTICUTLAWTRIBUNE (Nov. 2, 2018, 6:50 PM), https://bit.ly/2YfcpUd. As 
of November 2, 2018, she was the first unauthorized immigrant granted 
admission to the Connecticut bar. Id.  She is currently an Immigrant Justice 
Fellow at Make the Road New York, representing clients in immigration 
proceedings.  
Amicus Karla Perez was born in Mexico and came to the U.S. with her 
parents when she was two years old. Elise Foley, Court To Weight Fate Of 
Dreamers, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 8, 2018, 5:45 AM), https://bit.ly/2OpLpgi. 
She graduated from the Bauer College of Business and the Honors College at 
the University of Houston, and she went on to get her law degree from the 
University of Houston Law Center. While a law student, she interned with the 
Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Tahirih Justice 
Center, and Baker Ripley’s Immigration and Citizenship Program. See Karla 
Perez, Opinion: DACA let me serve Houston. Now Congress should make it 
permanent, HOUSTON CHRONICAL (Feb. 14, 2019), https://bit.ly/2tnpoES. She 
passed the July 2018 Texas bar exam, was admitted to the Texas Bar in 
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November 2018, and works as an immigration attorney, “helping survivors of 
gender-based violence in underserved communities throughout Houston.” Id. 
Ms. Perez is currently an Equal Justice Works Fellow sponsored by in part by 
Greenberg Traurig, LLP and The Texas Access to Justice Foundation and 
hosted by the Tahirih Justice Center in Houston, Texas. She also serves on the 
national board of United We Dream, which is the nation’s largest immigrant 
youth-led organization. Ms. Perez has since become a lawful permanent 
resident.  
Amicus Marisol Conde-Hernández was born in Mexico and, when she 
was one year old, her parents brought her to the U.S. Before going to law school, 
Ms. Conde-Hernández founded New Jersey’s first undocumented, youth-led 
immigrant rights group. Elise Schoening, Undocumented immigrant becomes 
activist, THE SIGNAL (Mar. 27, 2017), https://bit.ly/2panvJ6. She graduated 
from Rutgers University New Brunswick summa cum laude before attending 
Rutgers Law School, where she was the Marsha Wenks Public Interest Fellow 
and Co-Chair of Rutger’s Immigrant Rights Collective. Upon graduation, she 
became the first undocumented law graduate from a New Jersey law school. 
See id. She was admitted to the New Jersey bar in October 2018, becoming 
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New Jersey’s first undocumented female attorney. She currently practices 
immigration law and criminal defense in New Jersey.23  
Amicus Jackeline Saavedra-Arizaga came from Peru to the U.S. when 
she was fourteen years old. After graduating high school, Ms. Saavedra-
Arizaga worked different jobs to pay for college, eventually graduating cum 
laude from the State University of New York at Stony Brook in 2007. See Chau 
Lam, Mixed reaction to Obama immigration policy, NEWSDAY (June 15, 2012, 
10:37 PM), https://www.newsday.com/long-island/mixed-reaction-to-obama-
immigration-policy-1.3785384. Ms. Saavedra-Arizaga then attended law 
school at Touro College. In law school, Ms. Saavedra-Arizaga was a legal fellow 
at SEPA Mujer, where she advocated for domestic violence survivors and 
others within the Latina community on Long Island. LONG ISLAND REGIONAL 
IMMIGRATION ASSISTANCE CENTER, About,  http://www.longislandriac.com/abo 
ut.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2019). She was also recognized in 2012 as one of 
the “40 under 40 Latino Rising Stars” by the Hispanic Coalition, New York. Id. 
In 2013, Ms. Saavedra-Arizaga received DACA status and graduated law 
school. Following the Vargas decision, Ms. Saavedra-Arizaga was admitted to 
the New York bar in 2015. She is now an attorney at the Immigration Unit at 
                                              
23 Ms. Conde-Hernández’s story was documented in American Sueño: 




Suffolk County Legal Aid Society, where she provides advice to Suffolk Legal 
Aid attorneys and others about the immigration consequences of criminal 
charges for noncitizen clients. Id. 
These are a few examples of the applicants who would be precluded from 
practicing law in Utah absent this Court’s adoption of the Proposed Rule. 
These amici demonstrate that qualified DACA recipients and similar 
unauthorized immigrants are equally capable of establishing the “honesty, 
trustworthiness, diligence, [and] reliability” necessary to be a Utah attorney. 
Utah R. Bar Admission 14-708(a). Failing to adopt the Proposed Rule would be 
a disservice to the Utah Bar, which would benefit greatly from the diversity 
applicants like the above amici would bring to the bar, and the expected 
voluntary pro-bono representation they could provide to Utah’s low-income 
population. One California court, considering a statutory exclusion that 
prevented a “permanent resident alien” from admission to the bar, put it 
eloquently:  
For a contemporary example we need only look to the case of the 
present petitioner. As noted above, he settled in California over a 
decade ago with the intent of becoming a permanent resident … ; 
he received both his undergraduate and legal education here, and 
took and passed the California Bar Examination. To suggest that 
such a person lacks “appreciation of the spirit of American 
institutions” merely because he is not himself a citizen 
demonstrates the irrationality of excluding aliens on this ground. 
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Raffaelli v. Comm. of Bar Exam’rs, 496 P.2d 1264, 1270 (Cal. 1972). In light of 
the many examples of unauthorized immigrants successfully and ethically 
practicing law in other states, it would be irrational for Utah to categorically 
bar qualified unauthorized immigrants simply because of their immigration 
status. See id. 
C. A Person’s Immigration Status Does Not Relate to That 
Person’s Ability to Establish Character and Fitness.  
A bar applicant’s immigration status simply is not relevant to that 
person’s character and fitness to practice law. First, unlawful presence within 
the U.S. has “always been a civil, not criminal, violation” of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (“INA”). Congressional Research Service Report, 
Immigration Enforcement in the United States, at 8 (April 6, 2006), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33351.pdf (emphasis added); see also Arizona v. 
United States, 567 U.S. 387, 407 (2012) (“[I]t is not a crime for a removable 
alien to remain present in the United States.”).  
Second, the INA authorizes the Attorney General to cancel the removal 
of, and adjust a deportable immigrant’s status if, among other things, the 
immigrant has had good moral character during his or her stay in the United 
States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). Thus, even the INA recognizes that 
unauthorized immigrants may still possess good moral character despite their 
immigration status, and this Court should not presume otherwise.  
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Based on the foregoing, this Court should adopt the Proposed Rule. It 
would benefit the bar, the community, and society. And as discussed next, this 
Court indeed has the authority to adopt the Proposed Rule.  
II. THIS COURT HAS EXCLUSIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
AUTHORITY GOVERNING BAR ADMISSIONS AND SHOULD 
ADOPT THE PROPOSED RULE UNDER THAT AUTHORITY.    
As a preliminary matter, § 1621 does not make unauthorized 
immigrants ineligible for a Utah bar license, for the reasons already explained 
by other amici. E.g., Br. of Ad Hoc Coalition of Law Professors 7–15; Br. of Parr 
Brown Gee & Loveless, P.C. 3–7. But even if § 1621 does apply here, this Court 
is the constitutionally mandated governmental branch to opt out of § 1621(a)’s 
prohibitions. Section 1621(d) authorizes this Court to grant Petitioners 
admission to the Utah State bar and it can do so because: (1) Utah’s 
Constitution vests all power to regulate the practice of law with this Court and 
a contrary interpretation violates Utah’s Constitution; (2) any contrary  
interpretation requiring Utah legislative action to opt out would violate 
principles of federalism embodied in the Tenth Amendment; and (3) an 
interpretation requiring Utah legislative action also violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  
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A. Section 1621(d) Authorizes This Court to Allow 
Unauthorized Immigrants Admission to the Utah State Bar, 
and a Contrary Interpretation Violates the Utah 
Constitution. 
Section 1621 prohibits states from conferring certain benefits upon 
defined “aliens” unless the state enacts a law opting out of the federal 
restrictions. In re Vargas, 10 N.Y.S.3d at 589. Even if this Court were to find a 
Utah bar license is a “benefit” falling within § 1621’s scope, this Court, and 
only this Court, may opt out of the federal restriction under § 1621(d). 
The court in Vargas analyzed § 1621(d)’s opt out provision consistent 
with Utah’s constitutional system for regulating the practice of law. The proper 
interpretation of § 1621(d) authorizes this Court to permit membership of 
unauthorized immigrants in the Utah State Bar because this Court is the 
constitutionally mandated coequal branch of government with exclusive 
responsibility for determining who can practice law in Utah.  See Utah Const. 
art. VIII, § 4; Injured Workers Ass’n of Utah v. Utah, 2016 UT 21, ¶ 14, 376 
P.3d 14  (“Because there is no limitation found within the constitution on our 
ability to govern the practice of law, we maintain the exclusive authority to do 
so.”). From Utah’s statehood, this Court has “always had the ability to regulate 
the admission and discipline of attorneys.” Injured Workers Ass’n of Utah, 2016 
UT 21, ¶ 17.  
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Before 1981, this Court’s power was inherent and not exclusive—this 
Court and the legislature “concurrently governed the Utah State Bar.” Id. at 
¶ 19.  That ended in 1985, “when the constitution was amended to explicitly 
grant the Utah Supreme Court the exclusive power to govern the practice of 
law.” Id. ¶ 21; Utah Const. art. VIII, § 4 (“[T]he Supreme Court by rule shall 
govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct 
and discipline of persons admitted to practice law.”). And this Court has since 
rejected any notion that it shares “power to regulate the practice of law with 
the legislature.”  Id. at ¶ 28.   
For over thirty years, therefore, this Court has been the sole 
governmental branch with authority to determine whether persons are eligible 
to practice law in Utah. The framers of the 1985 amendment were wise in 
taking this power from the legislature and placing it with this Court because 
“[t]his power is considered essential to the [sic] maintaining an independent 
judiciary.” Id. at ¶ 23 (internal alteration in original) (quoting Constitutional 
Revision Comm’n, Report to the Governor and the 45th Legislature 19 (1984)); 
see also Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1066 (1991) (“[T]he courts 
have historically regulated admission to the practice of law before them.”).   
Pursuant to the Utah Constitution, this Court creates all rules governing 
the practice of law in Utah including rules governing the qualifications of 
applicants. For example, this Court establishes the Character and Fitness 
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requirements candidates must meet, and it establishes rules requiring the type 
of bar examination. Accordingly, as the result of the 1985 amendment, the 
legislature now lacks constitutional authority to opt out under § 1621(d).24 
Because Utah’s legislature was stripped of its power to regulate the practice of 
law, this Court is Petitioners’ only recourse. This Court should construe the 
phrase “enactment of a State law” to include any state action that has the force 
of law, including the orders of this duly empowered court. Under this reading, 
an order of this Court admitting Petitioners to the bar would satisfy the opt 
out provision. 
A narrower interpretation, like that adopted by the Florida Supreme 
Court, would not pass constitutional muster in Utah. The Florida Supreme 
Court construed § 1621(d)’s opt out provision to require the state legislature to 
pass a bill the governor would then sign into law. See Florida Bd. of Bar 
Examiners, 134 So.3d at 435. But, as discussed above, the Utah Constitution 
has now vested this Court with exclusive rule-making authority regarding bar 
admissions. The Utah State Legislature therefore cannot pass a law in the 
                                              
24  It appears some Utah legislators agree. Dennis Romboy, Utah legislators 
eye ways for law school grads with DACA status to take bar exam, KSL (May 
16, 2018), https://bit.ly/2JmTnaS (quoting state legislator as saying, “I don’t 
know that there is a legislative remedy” for allowing DACA recipients 
admission to the Utah Bar, “given that the Supreme Court exclusively 
regulates the practice of law”).  
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same way Florida did.25 Also, the Florida court did not address whether its 
interpretation of § 1621(d) violates the Tenth Amendment. See In re Vargas, 
10 N.Y.S.3d at 594 (explaining that no prior courts, including Florida, 
addressed whether § 1621(d) violates the Tenth Amendment). As discussed 
below, the Florida court’s interpretation indeed violates the Tenth Amendment.  
Accordingly, this Court should follow and adopt the Vargas court’s 
interpretation to avoid the constitutional conflict. See Nevares v. M.L.S., 2015 
UT 34, ¶ 38, 345 P.3d 719 (explaining that under the canon of constitutional 
avoidance “courts may reject[] one of two plausible constructions of a statute 
on the ground that it would raise grave doubts as to its constitutionality”). 
B. Interpreting “Enactment of a State Law” to Require Utah 
Legislative Action Violates the Tenth Amendment.  
A legislative enactment requirement, if § 1621(d) were read to impose 
one, would be unconstitutional because principles of state sovereignty under 
                                              
25  To interpret § 1621(d) as requiring Utah’s legislature to act would also 
result in absurdity, because such an interpretation would require the Utah 
legislature to do what the Utah legislature is forbidden from doing. Injured 
Workers Ass’n of Utah, 2016 UT 21, ¶ 21; Utah Const. art. VIII, § 4. For this 
reason as well, this Court should adopt the Vargas court’s interpretation. State 
ex rel. Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 15 n.5, 165 P.3d 1206 (“[W]hen  the statutory 
language plausibly presents the court with two alternative readings, we prefer 
the reading that avoids absurd results.”); see also Turner v. Staker & Parson 
Co., 2012 UT 30, ¶ 12, 284 P.3d 600 (“Wherever possible, we give effect to every 
word of a statute, avoiding any interpretation which renders parts or words in 
a statute inoperative or superfluous”).  
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the Tenth Amendment protect the integrity and independence of state 
governments against undue interference from the federal government. “The 
Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to 
require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.”  New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992). But that is exactly what a legislative 
enactment requirement would do here.  
Under the Tenth Amendment, “The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. Const. amend. X. The Tenth 
Amendment “expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may 
not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the state’s integrity or their ability 
to function effectively in a federal system.” Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 
547 n.7 (1975). The Tenth Amendment recognizes the historical fact that 
“States entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact.”  Blatchford 
v.  Native Vill. Of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991). And “inherent in the 
respect for state sovereignty is the recognition that ‘the Constitution has never 
been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to 
govern according to Congress’ instructions.’” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 577 (2012) (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 162).   
Federalism principles embodied in the Tenth Amendment bar both direct 
and indirect interference by the federal government. For example, Congress 
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may not direct a state to enact a specific law or implement a specific policy, 
and “Congress may not simply ‘commandeer the legislative process of the 
States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory 
program.’” New York, 505 U.S. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). Congress also may not 
commandeer executive-branch officials. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 
(1997). Even when Congress incentivizes the states to act in a certain way, it 
cannot unduly coerce the states into making choices in a way that undermines 
the independence of the decision-making process. See New York, 505 U.S. at 
174–78; Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 577–78.   
Similarly, Congress violates federalism principles when it specifies 
which state official or which branch of state government may exercise the 
power of the state sovereign. Since “a State can only perform its functions 
through its officers, a restraint upon them is a restraint upon its sovereignty.” 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 747 (1999). Accordingly, the United States 
Supreme Court has interpreted a statute contrary to its “plain language” to 
avoid interfering with state government decision-makers. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 
501 U.S. 452, 465–66 (1991) (refusing to apply the federal Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act to a state’s requirement that its supreme-court judges 
retire at the age of seventy, even though the “plain language” dictated 
otherwise). In doing so, the Court explained that it is “essential to the 
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independence of the States … that their power to prescribe the qualifications 
of their own officers [should be] exclusive, and free from external interference, 
except so far as plainly provided by the Constitution of the United States.” Id. 
at 460. Gregory dealt with the state’s sovereign interest in determining who 
holds office. Under the Tenth Amendment a state has a similar interest in 
determining which of its branches makes governing decisions. 
State sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment therefore protects a 
state’s choice to allocate power among its coequal branches of government. 
Congress lacks authority to dictate to the states which governmental branch 
possesses power over a particular governmental function. “The ability, indeed 
the right, of the states to structure their governmental decision-making 
processes as they see fit is essential to the sovereignty protected by the Tenth 
Amendment.”  In re Vargas, 10 N.Y.S.3d at 594.  If the opt out provision were 
construed to impose a legislative enactment requirement, it would violate 
Utah’s state sovereignty because it would dictate that Utah may only regulate 
legal practice through its legislature, and not through its courts.   
But as discussed above, the Utah Constitution was amended to eliminate 
the legislature’s power to regulate legal practice and to delegate all authority 
to this Court. Injured Workers Ass’n of Utah, 2016 UT 21, ¶¶ 19, 28. Were this 
Court to construe § 1621(d) to require a legislative enactment, the State’s 
hands would be tied, because the Utah Constitution, as interpreted by this 
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Court, flatly prohibits the Utah Legislature from enacting any state law 
governing bar admissions.  
In sum, Utah’s distribution of responsibility for bar admission decisions 
represents a careful balancing that the federal government has no authority to 
disrupt. Utah has a fundamental interest in allocating power among its three 
coequal governmental branches and is in a unique position to determine how 
best to allocate responsibility for regulating the practice of law. Utah has 
clearly spoken that regulations governing the practice of law are best handled 
by the judiciary, and thus only handled by the judiciary. Construing § 1621(d) 
to require a legislative enactment means that Congress can substitute its 
preferences for the Utah Constitution. This, Congress cannot do. See U.S. 
Const. amend. X. 
C. Interpreting “Enactment of a State Law” to Require Utah 
Legislative Action Violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause.  
As explained above, interpreting § 1621(d) to require legislative 
enactment would have the practical result of ensuring bar applicants like 
Petitioners can never obtain a Utah bar license, because the Utah Constitution 
prohibits the legislature from enacting the law that § 1621(d) requires. Injured 
Workers Ass’n of Utah, 2016 UT 21, ¶ 21; Utah Const. art. VIII, § 4. Thus, a 
decision interpreting the opt out provision as requiring legislative enactment 
is a decision that those like Petitioners are categorically banned from the 
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practice law in Utah. Such a decision would violate the Constitution’s Equal 
Protection clause.  
Under the Equal Protection clause, “No state shall make or enforce any 
law which shall … deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Utah Const. art. 
I, § 24 (“All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.”). “The 
Equal Protection Clause directs that ‘all persons similarly situated shall be 
treated alike.’” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (quoting F.S. Royster 
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). “A State cannot exclude a 
person from the practice of law or from any other occupation in a manner or 
for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.” Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of State of N.M., 353 
U.S. 232, 238–39 (1957). The Equal Protection Clause was adopted to abolish 
governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on 
the basis of individual merit. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221–22. “A State can require 
high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in 
its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must 
have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice 
law.” Schware, 353 U.S. at 239. 
A decision that denies DACA recipients, those granted TPS, or 
unauthorized immigrants in general from admission to the Utah Bar would 
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unlawfully classify those groups for disparate treatment in at least three 
different ways. First, such a decision would treat DACA recipients who need a 
license for their profession differently from other DACA recipients who do not. 
Second, a decision banning unauthorized immigrants in general from 
obtaining a bar license treats them differently from citizens or other applicants. 
Third, and relatedly, a decision banning DACA recipients from obtaining a bar 
license would treat bar applicants differently on the basis of race. Although 
DACA is not solely limited to the Latinx population, the overwhelming 
majority of DACA recipients are from Mexico and Central and South America. 
UCSIS, Approximate Active DACA Recipients: Country of Birth, 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%2
0Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/All%20Form%20Types/DACA/DAC
A_Population_Data_July_31_2018.pdf (showing that, of about 703,000 active 
DACA recipients in July 2018, the top four most common countries of birth for 
such recipients were Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, which 
accounted for 623,000 of active DACA recipients, or about 89%).  
Accordingly, for this Court to find that § 1621(d) requires legislative 
action, this Court would also have to find that there is at least26 a rational basis 
                                              
26  A higher level of scrutiny would likely apply here, see Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny to a state law 
that created a classification based on alienage); Application of Griffiths, 413 
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for treating DACA recipients and unauthorized immigrants in general 
differently from other equally qualified bar applicants. See Brewer, 757 F.3d at 
1065. But there is no such rational basis here, because a bar applicant’s 
immigration status has nothing to do with whether the applicant is qualified 
to practice law. 
Any disparate treatment by Utah of DACA recipients (or unauthorized 
immigrants) must be rationally related to a legitimate state interest to be 
constitutional. City of Clerburne v. Clerburne Living Or., 473 U.S. 432, 440 
(1985). Rational basis review is the most deferential level of review for the 
State. State action must be struck down unless there is some rational basis for 
it. FCC v. Beach Comm., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).   
No doubt the State has a “legitimate interest in determining whether [an 
applicant] has the qualities of character and the professional competence 
                                              
U.S. 717, 721 (1973) (same): Nyqusit v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (same), or 
possibly intermediate scrutiny, see Plyer, 457 U.S. at 214–20 (applying 
heightened scrutiny to children whose presence is unauthorized); Bowen v. 
Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 60–03 (1987) (explaining that intermediate scrutiny 
applies to quasi-suspect groups and those groups are discrete, obvious, 
immutable, or distinguishing characteristics, and are politically powerless). 
But because § 1621, if interpreted to categorically bar all unauthorized 
immigrants from receiving bar licenses, fails even rational basis review, this 
Court need not resolve which level applies. Brewer, 757 F.3d at 1065 (affirming 
a preliminary injunction against an Arizona policy that denied drivers’ licenses 
to DACA recipients, finding it unnecessary to decide what standard of scrutiny 
applies because Arizona’s “policy is likely to fail even rational basis review”).  
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requisite to the practice of law.” Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 7 (1971) 
(plurality opinion). This Court has stated “[t]he practice of law is so affected 
with the public interest that the state has both a right and a duty to control 
and regulate it in order to promote the public welfare.” Nelson v. Smith, 154 
P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1944). The practice of law is regulated to ensure certain 
qualifications are met, such as good moral character, proficiency in the law, 
and possession of the requisite skill set to practice the profession. Schware, 353 
U.S. at 238–39; New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 276 (1985); Injured 
Workers Ass’n of Utah, 2016 UT 21, ¶¶ 17–20. Ultimately, an applicant’s 
conduct should demonstrate “honesty, trustworthiness, diligence, [and] 
reliability,” and this Court has established seventeen factors to determine an 
applicant’s character and fitness. See Utah R. Bar Admission 14-708.   
The state’s interest in regulating the practice of law is not advanced by 
treating unauthorized immigrants differently than other equally qualified bar 
applicants. A per se ban on unauthorized immigrants is not related to any of 
the factors used to determine a bar applicant’s character and fitness. See id. 
14-708(d). Nor is there any evidence that unauthorized immigrants are 
unqualified to be attorneys by virtue of their immigration status.  
In sum, an applicant’s immigration status simply has nothing to do with 
the purposes of licensing attorneys—immigration status has no bearing on 
whether an attorney graduated law school, passed the bar, or otherwise has 
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the qualifications necessary to be an attorney. This is especially true here, 
where Petitioners both graduated from ABA accredited Utah law schools, are 
members in good standing of the State Bar of California and otherwise appear 
to meet all of Utah’s standards for bar admissions except for immigration 
status. Petitioners have already been admitted to practice law in California 
without incident, and Petitioners’ non-citizen immigration status does not 
denigrate the standards of the bar, nor does it allow for others who may be 
unqualified to be admitted to the bar. The only distinction between Petitioners 
and every other member of the Utah Bar is that Petitioners, through no fault 
of their own, were brought to this country as children. This distinction has no 
bearing on Petitioners’ ability to practice law, and a distinction on this basis is 
not rationally related to the state’s interest. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioners, as well as other DACA recipients, and unauthorized 
immigrants in general, should not be prejudged as morally unfit to be lawyers 
merely because of their immigration status. To the contrary, the experience of 
other states is that such individuals are a boon to the profession and a benefit 
to society. And because this Court is the only branch of government with the 
explicit authority to adopt such a rule under the Utah Constitution, this Court 
can and should adopt a rule allowing otherwise qualified unauthorized 
immigrants to be admitted to the Utah Bar.  
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